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DOING BETTER FOR CHILD MIGRANTS 
  
SUSAN FRELICH APPLETON* 
 
Professor Ann Laquer Estin’s Child Migrants and Child Welfare: 
Toward a Best Interests Approach1 makes several important contributions 
to our understanding of the complicated legal questions posed by a timely 
and too often tragic phenomenon: large numbers of unaccompanied child 
migrants, including many coming into the United States. Estin helpfully 
disentangles and explores the welter of possibly applicable laws, from 
U.S. constitutional provisions to international human rights laws, federal 
immigration laws, and state family laws.2 Her careful analysis also 
exposes significant gaps, pointing out how some issues fall between 
relevant bodies of law.3  
Although each of the sources of law canvassed in the article is 
animated by its own set of values and assumptions, Estin’s bottom line is 
that “we can and should do better”4 for the children in question. As an 
American family law expert, Estin identifies her principal area of concern 
as “assur[ing] that the federal agencies who take custody of 
unaccompanied minors are adequately addressing children’s needs for care 
and protection as the process unfolds, including their need for legal 
representation”—responsibilities assigned to the Office of Refugee 
Resettlement (ORR) in Department of Health and Human Services.5 Given 
her expertise and her central concern, Estin recommends infusing all the 
different areas of law pertinent to child migrants with due regard for 
family law’s ubiquitous “best interests principle.”6 
For those of us who lament how harm to children has become 
acceptable collateral damage in the pursuit of stricter immigration laws 
and enforcement practices, Estin’s call to focus on children and to do 
 
 
* Lemma Barkeloo & Phoebe Couzins Professor of Law, Washington University School of Law 
in St. Louis. 
1 Ann Laquer Estin, Child Migrants and Child Welfare: Toward a Best Interests Approach, 17 
WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 589 (2018). 
2 See id. 
3 See id. at 590. 
4 Id. 
5 Id. 
6 See id. at 591. See JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN, ANNA FREUD, & ALBERT J. SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST 
INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 4 (1979) (explaining the importance of both physical and psychological 
wellbeing in serving the child’s best interests). This book, authored by a law professor, a 
psychoanalyst, and a pediatric psychiatrist, stands out as one of the classic authorities on how the legal 
system should treat children, even if some of its recommendations engendered controversy. See, e.g., 
Nancy D. Polikoff, From Third Parties to Parents: The Case of Lesbian Couples and Their Children, 
77 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 195, 202 n.80 (2014) (noting controversy over their recommendation for 
one custodial parent who would control access by other parent). 
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better for them comes none too soon. This response examines whether the 
best interests principle is up to the job, in light of lessons learned from 
child custody disputes and controversies about child migrants, past and 
present. 
I. THE PROMISE AND PERILS OF THE BEST INTERESTS PRINCIPLE  
To the extent that the best interests principle asks legal decisionmakers 
to stand in the child’s shoes, taking the child’s point of view7 and 
prioritizing the child’s need for a strong and continuous relationship with a 
parent (or one performing the role of parent),8 it has much to offer to the 
confused and confusing treatment of child migrants. For example, as Estin 
points out, using the best interests principle should, in theory, prevent the 
routine separation of U.S.-citizen children from their non-citizen parents9 
and should help ensure legal representation for unaccompanied children.10 
Such changes would represent significant improvements in the status quo, 
which now includes a “zero tolerance” policy imposing on adults who 
illegally enter the United States imprisonment and separation from their 
children.11 Another advantage of the best interests principle is that, as 
applied, it purports to require an individualized examination of a particular 
child and his or her situation, rejecting broad generalizations12 and in turn 
promising needed flexibility and nuance for crafting appropriate responses 
tailored to the specific plight of each child migrant.  
Yet, the best interests principle has difficulties of its own. The very 
terminology overpromises, suggesting that children in in difficult 
situations, for example, a contest between divorcing parents or a case of 
maltreatment (or a migration crisis), can have their best interests 
actualized, when a more realistic approach would seek to achieve “the 
least detrimental alternative” under challenging circumstances.13 Most 
 
 
7 See, e.g.,  GOLDSTEIN ET AL., at 40 (emphasizing how placement decisions should reflect the 
child’s sense of time). 
8 See, e.g., id. at 31 (emphasizing the importance of safeguarding the child’s need for continuity 
of relationships). 
9 Estin, supra note 1, at 594. 
10 Id. at 597. 
11 See Miriam Jordan & Ron Nixon, Trump Administration Threatens Jail and Separating 
Children From Parents for Those Who Illegally Cross Southwest Border, N.Y. Times (May 8, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/07/us/politics/homeland-security-prosecute-undocumented-
immigrants.html.  
12 “In a custody or adoption proceeding, we are not concerned with the best interest of children 
generally; we are concerned, rather, with the best interest of THE child.” In re Petition of R.M.G., 454 
A.2d 776, 795 (D.D.C. 1982) (Mack, J., concurring) (emphasis in original). See Robert H. Mnookin, 
Child-Custody Adjudication: Judicial Functions in the Face of Indeterminacy, 39 L. & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 226, 227, 247 (Summer 1975).  
13 GOLDSTEIN, et al., supra note 6, at 53. 
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prominently, the principle provides a notoriously indeterminate standard, 
as scholars and law reformers have long pointed out in examining the 
principle’s use to resolve child custody disputes.14 In the context of 
custody disputes, the principle’s indeterminacy creates obstacles to 
settlement15 and often appears to send destructive messages about the 
relative value of the competing parents.16 In part for such reasons, 
contemporary custody law has come to rely less on best interests and, 
instead, increasingly on joint custody arrangements17 and private 
ordering.18 Extending the best interests principle to child migrants and 
their legal problems would not, in most cases, trigger these particular 
disadvantages specific to custody disputes. 
I have far less confidence, however, that the indeterminacy of the best 
interests principle in the context of child migration would avoid an 
additional difficulty for which it has been called out in custody cases: the 
invitation for decisionmakers to impose their own intuitions, assumptions, 
and value judgments.19 Family law is replete with custody cases in which 
trial judges have used the best interests principle to disapprove of mothers 
pursuing higher education or careers,20 penalize women’s sexual choices,21 
and favor conventional religions,22 to name just a few examples. In 
response, some state legislatures have sought to tame the best interests 
principle in the custody context with statutory “dos” and “don’ts”—factors 
that courts must consider and factors that they must not.23 No such 
statutory guardrails presently exist in the context of child migrants. 
 
 
14 See Mnookin, supra note 12, at 255-61. See also Robert H. Mnookin, Child Custody Revisited, 
77 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 249, 250-53 (2014) (maintaining that indeterminacy claims made in 1975 
remain largely true years later). 
15 See Mnookin, supra note 12, at 262. 
16 See id. at 290 (hypothesizing how deciding custody by “coin flip” would avoid this problem). 
17 See, e.g., CAL.  FAM.  CODE § 3080 (West, Westlaw through 2018 Legis. Sess.) (“There is a 
presumption, affecting the burden of proof, that joint custody is in the best interest of a minor 
child. . . .”). 
18 See, e.g., MO. ANN. STAT. § 452.310.8 (West, Westlaw through 2017 Legis. Sess.) (requiring 
divorcing parents to file proposed parenting plan, informing the court how they would divide 
residential time, decisionmaking authority, and child support). 
19 See, e.g., David L. Chambers, Rethinking the Substantive Rules for Custody Disputes in 
Divorce, 83 MICH. L. REV. 477, 481 (1984) (“Many people criticize judges who decide custody cases 
for giving inappropriate expression to personal or sexist biases.”) 
20 See, e.g., Ireland v. Smith, 542 N.W.2d 344 (Mich. Ct.  App.  1995); Rowe v. Franklin, 663 
N.E.2d 955 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995). 
21 See, e.g., Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984) (interracial relationship); Fulk v. Fulk, 827 
So.2d 736 (Miss.  Ct. App.  2002) (same-sex relationship). 
22 See, e.g., In re Marriage of Atchley 334 S.W.3d 709, 715-16 (Mo. Ct. App. 2011).  
23 See, e.g., MO. ANN. STAT. § 452.375.2 (West, Westlaw through 2017 Legis. Sess.) (listing 
factors that court must consider), § 452.375.8 (disallowing preference based on parent’s age, sex, or 
financial status or child’s age or sex). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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Further, another important limit on the best interests principle, the 
constitutional right of fit parents to decide how to rear their children,24 
would not typically apply to unaccompanied child migrants, leaving wide 
room for government officials, including judges, to invoke “best interests” 
to advance agendas disconnected from the minor in question. 
II. CAUTIONARY TALES FROM THE PAST 
Migrant children played starring roles in two highly publicized cases 
from the not too distant past. In one, decisionmakers at various stages used 
the best interests principle’s indeterminacy to give weight (perhaps 
decisive weight) to the perceived superiority of this country’s political 
regime, overcoming ordinary deference to the authority of parents 
choosing to live under communism. Although appellate courts eventually 
required a course correction, the proceedings took time—too much to 
remedy the earlier errors. The second case, with strikingly similar facts, 
demonstrates a more circumscribed approach, in which the decisionmakers 
resisted the temptation to allow the prospects of a child’s return to a 
communist-totalitarian state to justify a departure from the usual rule of 
parental autonomy. Together, these contrasting cases demonstrate the need 
to take care that political considerations do not infect well settled policies 
and practices governing child welfare. 
A. Walter Polovchak 
In Walter Polovchak’s case, which began in July, 1980, his parents lost 
custody of their twelve-year-old son in the United States when he resisted 
their plan for the family to return to its original home in the Ukrainian 
Soviet Socialist Republic.25 The Chicago police, the United States 
Department of State, the United States Immigration and Naturalization 
Service, and the local juvenile court all believed that Walter’s preference 
for living in a free society should trump his parents’ authority. As the 
Illinois court of appeals observed in reversing the juvenile court’s order 
that made Walter a ward of the court26 and displaced his parents’ ability to 
decide where Walter should live: “We have serious doubt as to whether 
 
 
24 Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 68 (2000) (plurality opinion) (citing “presumption that fit 
parents act in the best interests of their children”). See also JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN, ANNA FREUD, & 
ALBERT J. SOLNIT, BEFORE THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD (1979) (urging narrow grounds for 
state intervention in the parent-child relationship because intervention always harms the child). 
25 In re Polovchak, 454 N.E.2d 258, 259 (Ill. 1983). 
26 The juvenile court declared Walter a ward of the court on the grounds that he was a minor 
beyond the control of his parents and that “and that it was in the best interests of the minor and the 
public that Walter be adjudged a ward of the court.” Id. at 260. 
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the State would have intervened in this realm of family life and privacy 
had the parents’ decision to relocate involved a move to another city or 
state. The fact that the parents had decided to move to a country which is 
ruled under principles of government which are alien to those of the 
United States of America should not compel a different result.”27 
While the juvenile court order remained on appeal, the parents returned 
to the Ukraine without Walter.28 The Supreme Court of Illinois affirmed 
the court of appeals, holding that the evidence did not support the juvenile 
court’s order and its interference with parental custody. The United States 
Supreme Court denied certiorari.29 Walter’s parents also prevailed in 
federal litigation, in which they successfully claimed that the federal 
government had violated their due process rights by granting Walter 
asylum and issuing a “departure order control” barring him from leaving 
the United States—all without notice or an opportunity for a hearing for 
the parents.30  
Yet, by the time the United States Court of Appeals ruled in the 
parents’ favor in 1985,31 their victory had become a hollow one. Walter 
would turn eighteen in just days.  (In fact, the court did not publish the 
opinion until after his birthday.) Walter’s own rights and interests had 
grown more compelling with age,32 and—the court explained—“it is 
surely relevant that Walter has decided that he does not want to be a 
communist or an atheist and that his parents have only the few remaining 
days of his minority to try to change his mind.”33 Walter remained in the 
United States and became a citizen in 1985.34 
B. Elian Gonzales 
Five-year-old Elian Gonzalez used an inner tube to survive a hazardous 
boat trip from Cuba to Florida in 1999, although his mother perished in the 
same attempt to come to the United States. Following his rescue, Elian 
was placed temporarily in the custody of his great-uncle, Lazaro Gonzalez, 
 
 
27 In re Polovchak, 432 N.E.2d 873, 879 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981). 
28 See Polovchak, 454 N.E.2d at 264.  
29 465 U.S. 1065 (1984). 
30 Polovchak v. Meese, 774 F.2d 731, 733 (7th Cir. 1985). 
31 Id. at 731. 
32 Id. at 737. 
33 Id. 
34 See WALTER POLOVCHAK WITH KEVIN KLOSE, FREEDOM’S CHILD: A COURAGEOUS 
TEENAGER'S STORY OF FLEEING HIS PARENTS—AND THE SOVIET UNION—TO LIVE IN AMERICA 
(1988): Cynthia Dizikes, 1980s Newsmakers: Where Are They Now?, CHICAGO TRIB. (Nov. 23, 2011), 
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2011-11-23/news/ct-met-newsmakers-1980s-20111123_1_littlest-
defector-ukrainian-boy-walter-polovchak.  
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and his family in Miami. Elian’s father, who had separated from his 
mother but had maintained an ongoing relationship with the boy, asked the 
Miami relatives to return him to Cuba, where Elian would live with his 
father, the father’s wife, and their child. The Miami relatives declined and 
filed a petition for asylum on behalf of Elian.35 
Both the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) and the federal 
courts rejected the asylum petition. The INS reasoned that young children 
lack the capacity to apply for asylum and that, absent special 
circumstances, the child’s parent is the proper adult to represent the child 
in asylum proceedings and that the father’s residence in Cuba did not 
constitute a special circumstance.36 The United States Court of Appeals 
centered its analysis on the usual authority of parents to decide where their 
children will live. In telling language, however, the court conceded that it 
had reasons to worry even though it deemed the INS policy to be 
reasonable: 
According to the INS policy, that a parent lives in a communist-
totalitarian state is no special circumstance, sufficient in and of 
itself, to justify the consideration of a six-year-old child’s asylum 
claim (presented by a relative in this country) against the wishes of 
the non-resident parent. We acknowledge, as a widely-accepted 
truth, that Cuba does violate human rights and fundamental 
freedoms and does not guarantee the rule of law to people living in 
Cuba. Persons living in such a totalitarian state may be unable to 
assert freely their own legal rights, much less the legal rights of 
others. Moreover, some reasonable people might say that a child in 
the United States inherently has a substantial conflict of interest 
with a parent residing in a totalitarian state when that parent—even 
when he is not coerced—demands that the child leave this country 
to return to a country with little respect for human rights and basic 
freedoms.37 
Given these concerns, the court might well have come out the other 
way had it relied on a generalized best interests approach. Instead, the 
court set aside its obvious political and ideological preferences to follow 
the teachings of Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit, who counseled that 
deference to the autonomy of fit parents must come before any 
government intervention claiming to rest on best interests.38 
 
 
35 For these facts, see Gonzalez v. Reno, 212 F.3d 1338 (11th Cir. 2000). 
36 Id. at 1349. 
37 Id. at 1353 (citation & footnote omitted). 
38 GOLDSTEIN et al., supra note 24. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol17/iss3/6
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III. CURRENT CONTESTS 
Both Walter Polovchak’s case and that of Elian Gonzalez pit general 
considerations of best interests based on public policies about disfavored 
political regimes, on the one hand, against the liberty of fit parents to make 
relocation decisions for their children, on the other. These cases provide 
illuminating background for controversies that have surfaced today. 
Today’s cases differ in important ways that might make them even more 
difficult than the earlier precedents, however. First, the contemporary 
controversies concern unaccompanied minors, that is, children who lack fit 
parents—so the foundational rule of parental autonomy cannot resolve the 
conflict. Second, the discord centers not on comparisons between the 
United States system of government versus a foreign system, but rather on 
political and cultural divides sparked purely by matters of domestic law, 
specifically abortion access and LGBT parenting. Yet, in my view, these 
cases expose the minefields that unchallenged use of the best interests 
principle can produce for child migrants. 
A. Abortion 
Currently, a class action is pending challenging the anti-abortion 
policies of ORR, an arm of the Department of Health and Human 
Services, which manages the care and placement of “‘alien children who 
are in Federal custody by reason of their immigration status.’”39  
This litigation arose after Scott Lloyd, Director of ORR, imposed 
obstacles to abortion access on minors within ORR’s authority.40 For 
example, in one case, J.D., age 17, entered the United States as an 
unaccompanied minor, was apprehended at the U.S. border, and was 
remanded to ORR’s custody at a shelter in Texas, where a medical 
examination determined she was pregnant.41 Deciding she wanted an 
abortion, she followed Texas law applicable to minors seeking abortion 
without parental involvement by initiating a “judicial bypass” in a court 
that found her sufficiently mature to make her own abortion decision.42 
While not contesting her constitutional right to obtain an abortion so long 
 
 
39 Garza v. Hargan, 2018 WL 1567600, at *1 (D.D.C. 2018) (quoting 6 U.S.C. § 279(b)(1)(A)). 
40 See Jeremy W. Peters, Under Trump, an Office Meant to Help Refugees Enters the Abortion 
Wars, N.Y. TIMES, (Apr. 5, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/05/us/politics/refugee-office-
abortion-trump.html.  
41 Garza, 2018 WL 1567600, at *2. 
42 Garza v. Hargan, 874 F.3d 735, 736-37 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (Millett, J., concurring). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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as she complied with the requirements of state law,43 ORR would not let 
J.D. proceed until she first “extract[ed] herself from custody.”44 Doing so, 
however, would require either returning to the country from which she had 
traveled to flee abuse or finding a sponsor, that is, a foster parent, willing 
to take custody.45 
ORR sought to justify these requirements on two grounds. First, 
government should play no role in “facilitating” J.D.’s abortion, given that 
the Constitution does not require government assistance for those seeking 
to exercise their reproductive rights.46 Yet, as Judge Millett’s opinion 
points out, J.D. was not seeking facilitation in the form of payment, 
transportation assistance, or paperwork, not to mention the fact that 
sponsorship would require considerable government involvement.47 
Second, ORR strongly opposes abortion and contends that terminating her 
pregnancy would not serve J.D.’s best interests. Again, as Judge Millett 
observes, however, once the state bypass judge determined that J.D. had 
sufficient maturity to make her own decision, it foreclosed reliance on best 
interests.48 Indeed, as Judge Millett explains, “the government does not 
even claim that it is making an individualized ‘best interests’ judgment in 
forbidding J.D.’s abortion. It is simply supplanting her legally authorized 
best interests judgment with its own categorical position against 
abortion—which is something not even a parent or spouse or State could 
do. Only the big federal government gets this veto, we are told.”49 
Such (mis)use of the best interests principle in an effort to thwart 
abortions by unaccompanied minor migrants comes into focus even more 
clearly in an opinion granting class certification and a preliminary 
injunction in a challenge to such official policies.50 The district court’s 
opinion quotes Director Lloyd’s reaction to the plight of one 
unaccompanied minor migrant who had become pregnant as the result of a 
sexual assault: He believes that abortion is “‘violence that has the ultimate 
destruction of another human being as its goal,’ that ‘abortion does not 
here cure the reality that she is the victim of an assault,’ [and] that ‘[t]o 
decline to assist in an abortion here is to decline to participate in violence 
against an innocent life.’”51 Lloyd elaborated on his best interests 
rationale: 
 
 
43 Id. at 737. 
44 Id. (emphasis omitted). 
45 Id. 
46 See id. at 740; see generally, e.g., Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980). 
47 Garza, 874 F.3d at 740-41 (Millett, J., concurring). 
48 Id. at 741. 
49 Id. 
50 See Garza, 2018 WL 1567600. 
51 Id. at *2. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol17/iss3/6
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At bottom, this is a question of what is in the interest of the young 
woman and her child. How could abortion be in their best interest 
where other options are available, and where the child might even 
survive outside the womb at this stage of the pregnancy? Here there 
is no medical reason for abortion, it will not undo or erase the 
memory of the violence committed against her, and it may further 
traumatize her. I conclude that it is not in her interest.52 
J.D. ultimately obtained an abortion, with the assistance of an attorney 
who took the case to the U.S. Court of Appeals twice, first for an 
unsuccessful resolution by a three-judge panel and then for a favorable 
outcome upon rehearing en banc.53 The district court later certified a class 
action and—consistent with Supreme Court doctrine—issued a 
preliminary injunction against ORR policies and practices that unduly 
burden unaccompanied minors’ efforts to obtain abortions, including 
ORR’s effective exercise of a veto over such abortions.54 
Whatever the final outcome of the larger controversy, which continues 
with the government’s appeals,55 we can hear echoes of the classic 
problems that the best interests principle has engendered in the more 
routine custody context. Indeterminacy invites official value judgments 
that often have nothing to do with the particular child in question and her 
individual situation. 
B. LGBT Family Placement   
While the migration of unaccompanied children has produced a full-
blown “culture-war”56 battle centered on the reproductive rights, it has also 
begun to open up a new front over LGBT parenting. Lamda Legal has 
filed suit against the Department of Health and Human Services, as well as 
the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops (which receives 
 
 
52 Id. at *3. He continued:  
Refuge is the basis of our name and is at the core of what we provide, and we provide this to 
all the minors in our care, including their unborn children, every day. In this request, we are 
being asked to participate in killing a human being in our care. I cannot direct the program to 
proceed in this manner. We cannot be a place of refuge while we are at the same time a place 
of violence. We have to choose, and we ought to choose to protect life rather than to destroy 
it. 
Id. 
53 Garza, 874 F.3d at 735.  
54 Garza, 2018 WL 1567600, at *10-*11. For related litigation, see Doe v. Office of Refugee 
Resettlement, 884 F.3d 269 (5th Cir. 2018). 
55 See Notice of Appeal, Garza v. Azar, No. 18-5093 (D. C. Cir. Apr. 9, 2018); In re Alex Azar, 
No. 18-8003 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 12, 2018).  
56 See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 602 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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taxpayer funding for its placement services), for disqualifying a married 
lesbian couple in Texas from serving as foster parents for unaccompanied 
child migrants “because their family structure doesn’t ‘mirror the holy 
family.’”57 
Although the lawsuit, still in its early stages at the time of this writing, 
does yet not offer a fully developed picture of the role played by the best 
interests principle, one can easily imagine the likely possibilities based on 
earlier cases outside the migration setting. For example, in an unsuccessful 
challenge to a one-time Florida law banning adoptions by same-sex 
couples, the state defended the ban on the basis of the best interests 
principle, citing the importance of “dual-gender parenting . . . in shaping 
sexual and gender identity and in providing heterosexual role modeling.”58 
Such arguments not only rest on an explicit premise that heterosexual 
parents are better than LGBT parents, but also on an implicit premise that 
the best interests principle assumes a “fear of the queer child.”59 Such 
unsupported and generalized value judgments exemplify the perils of the 
best interests principle’s indeterminacy. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Of course, this country and its legal actors can and should do far better 
for unaccompanied migrant children than we are doing now, as Professor 
Estin compellingly demonstrates. Putting children (that is, each child) at 
the center of the analysis stands out as a worthy goal that would mark 
significant improvements over current American policies. Is the best 
interests principle the most effective way to achieve this goal?  Perhaps. 
Certainly, the principle is familiar, both from its long history in American 
 
 
57 See Family Equality Council Applauds Lawsuit Calling Out HHS Discrimination Against 
Lesbian Couple, FAMILY EQUALITY COUNCIL (Feb. 20, 2018), 
https://www.familyequality.org/news__media/2018/02/20/2345/family_equality_council_applauds_la
wsuit_calling_out_hhs_discrimination_against_lesbian_couple (describing Marouf v. Azar); Angela 
Morris, Lesbian Law Prof Sues Over Rejection as Foster Parent, TEX. LAW. (Feb. 21, 2018), 
https://www.law.com/texaslawyer/2018/02/21/lesbian-law-prof-sues-over-rejection-as-foster-parent/ 
(same). 
58 See Lofton v. Secretary of Dept. of Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804, 818 (11th Cir. 
2005). Later, a state court struck down the ban court as irrational and in violation of equal protection 
because of, inter alia, the absence of empirical evidence that parental sexual orientation affects child 
wellbeing. Florida Department of Children & Families v. Adoption of X.X.G., 45 So.3d 79 (Fla. Dist. 
Ct. App. 2010). But cf. Associated Press, Oklahoma Governor Signs Adoption Law Opposed by LGBT 
Groups, N.Y. TIMES (May 11, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/aponline/2018/05/11/us/ap-us-xgr-
gay-adoption-oklahoma.html (reporting law that allows adoption agencies to refuse to place children 
with LGBT parents, based on religious or moral objections). 
59 For persuasive challenge to this assumption, see Clifford Rosky, Fear of the Queer Child, 61 
BUFF. L. REV. 607, 685 (2013) (contending that “queerness is neither morally nor legally relevant to 
children’s best interests”). 
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custody law60 and its appearance in several international instruments.61 
Yet, it comes with baggage and poses risks, as past and present 
controversies illustrate. 
Perhaps, however, we might consider Professor Estin’s article as part 
of a series of broader efforts to clarify62 or even reconceptualize63 the legal 
understanding of childhood and the legal treatment of children, in the hope 
of doing better. Read through this lens, Professor Estin’s article insists that 
we must include in these emerging conversations an often forgotten and 
especially vulnerable group of children64 whose current wellbeing and 
future lives, even more than others’, depend directly on law. 
 
 
 
60 See MARY ANN MASON, FROM FATHER’S PROPERTY TO CHILDREN’S RIGHTS: A HISTORY OF 
CHILD CUSTODY IN AMERICA 121-60 (1994).  
61 See Estin, supra note 1, at 593. 
62 The American Law Institute has undertaken a project that aims to “restate” the law relevant to 
children. See RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW, CHILDREN AND LAW (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 1 
2018). 
63 See Anne C. Dailey & Laura A. Rosenbury, The New Law of the Child, 127 YALE L.J. 1448 
(2018). 
64 Indeed, the Department of Health and Human Services recently disclosed that it has lost track 
of nearly 1,500 migrant children.  See Ron Nixon, Federal Agencies Lost Track of Nearly 1,500 
Migrant Children Placed with Sponsors, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 26, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/26/us/politics/migrant-children-missing.html.  
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